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The HAVEN Act altered the definition of “current monthly income” to support veterans 
in bankruptcy.5 A debtor’s current monthly income (“CMI”) is the “average monthly income 
from all sources that the debtor receives.”6 CMI is calculated in order to determine whether a 
debtor’s income meets the threshold to file for protection under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, or in the alternative, whether the debtor must file under chapter 13.7 Therefore, the 
purpose of the CMI calculation is to determine whether the debtor’s income is high enough to 
make payments to unsecured creditors.8  
Before the enactment of the HAVEN Act, veteran benefits were included in a debtor’s 
CMI calculation.  Section 101(10A) of the Bankruptcy Code, which defines CMI, now 
excludes9: 
(IV) any monthly compensation, pension, pay, annuity, or allowance paid under 
title 10, 37, or 38 in connection with a disability, combat-related injury or 
disability, or death of a member of the uniformed services, except that any retired 
pay excluded under this subclause shall include retired pay paid under chapter 61 
of title 10 only to the extent that such retired pay exceeds the amount of retired 
pay to which the debtor would otherwise be entitled if retired under any provision 
of title 10 other than chapter 61 of that title. 
 
 This section excludes the mentioned veteran benefits from the Debtor’s CMI 
calculation, therefore lowering a debtor’s average income and thereby increasing the 
debtor’s chances to be eligible to file for relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.  
A. Legislative history surrounding the HAVEN Act  
 
 The legislative history for the HAVEN Act indicates that the act is intended to correct an 
“obvious inequity” in the Bankruptcy Code.10 This inequity is apparent when comparing the 
                                               
5 H.R. 2938. 
6 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) (2011). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Prior to the enactment of the HAVEN Act, section 101(10A) only excluded “benefits received under the Social 
Security Act, payments to victims of war crimes or crimes against humanity on account of their status as victims of 
such crimes, and payments to victims of international terrorism or domestic terrorism on account of their status as 
victims of such terrorism” from the CMI calculation. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) (2011).  
10 165 Cong. Rec. H7215-01, 2019 WL 3307644 (July 23, 2019). 
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exclusion of Social Security benefits from a debtor’s CMI calculation to the inclusion of veteran 
benefits in that calculation. In a 2005 amendment to section 101(10A) of the Bankruptcy Code, 
Social Security benefits were excluded from a debtor’s CMI calculation because “bankruptcy 
shouldn’t be made more difficult for those who are depending on Social Security for their 
livelihood.”11  
 Similar to Social Security benefits, veteran benefits “are a lifeline to many of its 
recipients,” and in turn including these benefits within the CMI calculation would make 
bankruptcy more difficult for those recipients.12 When veteran benefits are considered income 
for CMI purposes, veterans “become ineligible for the more immediate discharges available 
under Chapter 7 and, instead, they are steered into Chapter 13.”13 Therefore, because “these 
benefits are earned, and we must do right by our veterans and protect their economic security,” 
the HAVEN Act excludes veteran benefits from the CMI calculation.14  
II. Retroactivity of the HAVEN Act  
 
 “Retroactivity provisions often serve entirely benign and legitimate purposes, whether to 
respond to emergencies, to correct mistakes, to prevent circumvention of a new statute in the 
interval immediately preceding its passage, or simply to give comprehensive effect to a new law 
Congress considers salutary.”15 According to the legislative history, Congress believed the 
HAVEN Act would produce beneficial effects for veterans who are filing for bankruptcy because 
it will “remedy an imbalance in the Bankruptcy Code that disproportionately steers veterans 
receiving such benefits into Chapter 13 cases because they often fail the Chapter 7 means test.”16  
Therefore by amending section 10(10A), Congress is correcting an obvious mistake in treating 
                                               
11 House Report No. 116-169 (2019) (statement of Edward Kennedy). 
12 165 Cong. Rec. H7215-01, 2019 WL 3307644 (July 23, 2019). 
13 Id. 
14 https://www.baldwin.senate.gov/press-releases/haven-act.   
15 Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 268 (1994). 
16 https://nadler house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=393996. 
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Social Security benefits and veteran benefits disproportionately, and by proving they consider 
this law advantageous.   
A. The Landgraf Test  
 
In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, the United States Supreme Court implemented the 
current standard to determine whether a statue can be retroactively applied.17 According to the 
Landgraf test, to determine whether a federal statute can be applied retroactively it first must be 
determined whether Congress “has expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach.”18 If the 
statute contains no express language as to retroactivity as the HAVEN Act does, then it must be 
determined whether the retroactive effect would (1) impair rights a party possessed when he 
acted, (2) increase a party’s liability for past conduct (3) or impose new duties with respect to 
transactions already completed.19 If applying the new statute would not affect one of these three 
areas, it can be retroactive.20 
B. Application of the Landgraf Test  
 
The HAVEN Act is silent as to retroactivity, however “[e]ven absent specific legislative 
authorization, application of new statutes passed after the events in suit is unquestionably 
property in many situations.”21 In re Gresham is the only reported decision thus far to discuss the 
issue of retroactivity as it applies to the HAVEN Act.22 In In re Gresham, the bankruptcy court 
held that applying the HAVEN Act retroactively would impair the rights a party, the unsecured 
creditors, possessed when the creditor acted, and therefore it could not be applied.23 The court 
found that the unsecured creditors had a right to rely on the debtor’s confirmed schedules, which 
                                               
17 Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244. 
18 Id.at 280. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id.at 273. 
22 In re Gresham, No. 18-56289, WL 1170712 at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Mi. March 10, 2020). 
23 2020 WL 1170712 at *4. 
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included her veteran benefits.24 Additionally, the court stated, “the right of those unsecured 
creditors to object to confirmation would be impaired by a ‘retroactive’ application of the 
HAVEN Act to confirmation of the Debtor’s plan.”25 In taking this view, the court rejected the 
debtor’s argument that the unsecured creditors had no right to be paid out of her veteran benefits 
and therefore no right of theirs was impaired.26 
C. In re Gresham: Debtor’s Arguments  
Although the court found to the contrary, the Debtor’s argument in In re Gresham is 
more consistent with the HAVEN Act’s legislative history. The rationale for exclusion of Social 
Security benefits and veteran benefits were similar, however, Social Security benefits were 
excluded while veterans were not.27 Further, while unsecured creditors obtain a right to object to 
the confirmation of a plan, they cannot object because that plan does not include veteran 
benefits, just as they cannot object because the plan does not include Social Security benefits.28 
 As the Debtor and Trustee in In re Gresham agree, the second prong of the Landgraf test 
is not at issue because applying the HAVEN Act retroactively does not increase the unsecured 
creditor’s liability for past conduct.29 Prior to the HAVEN Act, veteran benefits were included in 
a debtor’s CMI calculation.30 Therefore, by including those benefits in a bankruptcy plan of 
reorganization, the unsecured creditors were following current law and would not be liable for 
doing so.  
Additionally, applying the HAVEN Act retroactively would not impose any new duties 
on unsecured creditors with respect to transactions that are already completed. The primary issue 
                                               
24 Id. 
25 Id.  
26 Id. 
27 House Report No. 116-169 (2019).   
28 In re Gresham, 2020 WL 1170712, at *4.   
 
29 Id. 
30 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) (2011).   
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the court faced in In re Gresham was whether the HAVEN Act provided a sufficient ground to 
modify the debtor’s confirmed plan pursuant to section 1329(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.31 The 
court recognized that the plan modification is based on the change made under the HAVEN Act, 
and if the modification is applied to the CMI calculation it would have a substantial impact on 
the debtor’s financial circumstances.32 On this issue the court held that “the HAVEN Act 
provides a legitimate reason for modification . . . to the Debtor’s plan for its duration.33 
Therefore, applying the HAVEN Act retroactively would not impose any new duties with 
respect to transactions already completed that In re Gresham did not already authorize.34 
Because the court held that the HAVEN Act provides a sufficient reason to ask for modification, 
veterans who filed under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code will modify their plans under this 
decision.35 Although those plans were previously confirmed and therefore completed, In re 
Gresham gives unsecured creditors the duty to modify those plans.36 In this way, going back to 
modify already completed plans based on the HAVEN Act is equivalent to retroactively applying 
it to confirmed plans.  
CONCLUSION 
 Congress’ purpose in enacting the HAVEN Act was to correct a mistake in the 
Bankruptcy Code -- that Social Security benefits were excluded from a debtor’s CMI calculation 
while veteran benefits were not.37 In correcting this mistake Congress acknowledged that similar 
to Social Security benefits, these benefits are a lifeline to veterans who receive them and in order 
                                               
31 In re Gresham, 2020 WL 1170712, at *4. U.S.C. 1329(a) states “at any time after confirmation of the plan but 
before the completion of payments under such plan, the plan may be modified, upon request of the debtor, the 
trustee, or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim,” but is silent as to what showing must be made to modify a 
confirmed plan.  
32 Id. at 6. 
33 Id. 
34 WL 1170712 at *5. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 165 Cong. Rec. H7215-01, 2019 WL 3307644 (July 23, 2019). 
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to properly honor their service they must be excluded.38 One court has held that the HAVEN Act 
should not be applied retroactively.  Nevertheless, there are arguments that would support its 
retroactive application, including that doing so would not impair a right an unsecured creditor 
possessed, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to 
transactions already completed.   
 
                                               
38 House Report No. 116-169 (2019).   
